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the statute no longer reflected a majority social viewpoint, there was even
stronger reason to invoke the equal protection clause and enjoin admittedly
discriminatory treatment.2 4
EXTENDING IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION BY
ENFORCING STATE "BLUE SKY" LAWS AGAINST
NONRESIDENTS"'
STATE "Blue Sky" laws,' by requiring the registration of securities or their
sellers,2 are designed to protect the public against fraudulent or unsound in-
vestment schemes. Although criminal sanctions are generally available to
(1933) ; cf. Wade v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d 181 (1947) ; .ec Boyn-
ton v. Fox, 60 F2d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 1932) ; People v. Oreck, 74 Cal. App. 2d 215, 221,
168 P.2d 186, 190 (1946) ; People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 354, 139 P.2d 118, 126
(1943). But see Creash v. State, 131 Fla. 111, 121, 179 So. 149, 153 (1938) ("If such
favoritism exists, the polls rather than the Court would be the proper forum to correct
it!"). See also cases cited note 18 spra.
On the other hand, failure to extend the equal protection clause to cases of diserimina-
tory law enforcement gives local police officials unlimited power to conduct prosecutions
based on racial, ideological, or political prejudice. See, for example, Jackie Cab Co, v.
Chicago Park Dist., 366 Ill. 474, 9 N.E2d 213 (1937) (discrimination against Negroes) ;
People v. Darcy, supra (discrimination against Communist). See also the allegation o[
political prejudice by the Society of Good Neighbors, supra note 7. For a strong denun-
ciation of thus placing a Damoclean sword in the hands of local police officials, see People
v. Darcy, supra at 360, 139 P.2d at 129: "It is much better for society that an accused
should go free, than for our criminal processes to be polluted by prosecutions founded on
prejudice against and hatred for the political beliefs of the accused."
24. See notes 6 and 20 supra.
* Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E. 2d 263
(1949), probable jurisdiction noted, 17 U.S.L. Waasr. 3365 (U.S. June 14, 1949).
1. The name given to these laws indicates their purpose--preventing "speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky.'" Hall v. Geiger-
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) (upholding constitutionality of Blue Sky laws).
2. All the states except Nevada have legislation regulating offers to sell or sales of
securities. All but two require some sort of registration:
(1) The "fraud" type of law requires neither licensing of distributors nor registra-
tion of securities; it merely prescribes penalties for fraud and authorizes injunctive pro-
ceedings to prevent frauds. Providing for the least regulatory detail, this type statute
exists in only two states. DEL. REv. CODE § 4369 (1935) ; N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49 :1-1 to
49:1-29 (1940). The New York "Martin Act," N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 352 to 359-h,
though purporting to be chiefly a "fraud" law, requires that dealers file certain statements
and notices with state officials. In effect, this modified "fraud" law provides for the
licensing of dealers. See Smith, State "Blue Sky" Laws and the Federal Securities Acts,
34 Micn. L. Rrv. 1135, 1137 n.8 (1936).
(2) The "licensing" type controls the distribution of securities by requiring dis-
tributors to be licensed. E.g., ME. Ray. STAT. c,55, § 208 (1944).
(3) The "inspection" type statute provides for the registration of securities that are
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compel registration,2 state officials prefer a more effective remedy-an in-
junction against the sale of unregistered securities. 4 Before an injunction may
issue, however, due process demands that in pcrsonam jurisdiction be obtained
over the defendant 5 This jurisdictional requirement may be satisfied by
to be sold in the state but does not require that their distributors be licensed. E.g., N. M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1701 to 50-1715 (1941).
(4) The most common type of statute, a combination 'licensing and inspection" law,
requires both the licensing of distributors and the registration of securities. E.g., Mo.
Rav. STAT. AN. §§ 8258-8292 (1943). See Smith, .supra, at 1137, 1133.
For a concise, over-all summary of how state Blue Sky acts generally operate, see
1 CCH BLuE Sxy LAW REP. 11 503-518 (1946). For their history and purpose, see
Rano & ,VAsnBu=N, BLuE SKY LAWS ix--xiii (1921).
Where securities enter interstate commerce, the states must share the regulatory
function with the Federal Government. 43 STAT. 74-92 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1946) (Securities Act of 1933) ; 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1946) (Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934). It is clear that these federal acts do not supersede state
provisions which are not conflicting. 48 STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1946). Fed-
eral acts are confined to the prevention of fraud by requiring full disclosure of the facts
relating to issues and by making unlawful the use of the mails or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce to defraud. See Hanna, The Securities Exchange Act as Supple-
ruentary of the Securities Act, 4 LAw & Coxmp,. P:on. 256 (1937) ; MacChesney and
O'Brien, Full Disclosure Under the Securities Act, 4 LAw & Cozrnazr. Pnoa. 133 (1937).
State acts, on the other hand, generally give the investing public additional protection by
passing upon the "soundness" of securities. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-836 (Burns 1933)
(Securities Commission can deny registration if business of issuer is "based upon un-
sound business principles"). See Wright, Correlation of State Blue Sky Laws and thc
Federal Securities Acts, 26 Coimam L.Q. 258, 261, 262 (1941), vhere practical methods
are suggested for integrating the various state and federal laws so that burdens on
interstate issues may be eliminated.
3. For a compilation of the laws by states, see 1 & 2 CCH BLUE SKY LA, REP.
(1946).
4. In addition to speed and prevention, administrative preference for using the
injunctive method may stem from a belief that lay juries are not qualified to deal with
questions relating to securities transactions. Moreover, in the absence of actual fraud,
administrators would rather secure compliance than impose criminal penalties. Communi-
cation to the YALE LAw JotmNAL from William C. King, Director of the Virginia State
Corporation Commission, October 10, 1949.
Every Blue Sky law provides for injunctive proceedings against violators. See 1 & 2
CCH BLUE SiT LAW REP. (1948). In some states, securities commissions may them-
selves issue injunctive-type cease and desist orders. E.g., VA. Coon Axzuz. §38M1
(52) (1942). In others, they must resort to the appropriate courts for injunctions. E.g.,
TEu. Civ. STAT. art. 600a, § 33 (Vernon 1942).
For a general evaluation of the injunction as an enforcement device, see Comment,
57 Y.E L. J. 1023 (1948). See also Maloney, Injunctiue Law Enforcement, 1 1macun
L. R. 1 (1949).
5. Penoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) ; Burdick, Serzice as a Requirement of Due
Process it Actions in Personam, 20 McH. L. RLnv. 422 (1922) ("A prime requisite of
due process is; of course, that the court shall have jurisdiction of the subject-matter .
In proceedings in personam-proceedings to determine the personal liability of the de-
fendant, no property being brought by the proceedings within the control of the court-
the court must also have jurisdiction of the defendant.").
Although injunctive-type proceedings are typically classified as in Personar, suits
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personal service when such suits are brought against nonresidents physically
present within the state.6 But where the nonresident is absent, the inability
to serve him personally subjects the state's jurisdiction to attack on due process
grounds.7
Virginia successfully met such an attack in Travelers Health Ass'n v. Coin-
monwealth of Virginia.8 Travelers, a nonprofit health corporation domiciled
in Nebraska, sold membership certificates 9 by mail to Virginia residents with-
out registering under the state Blue Sky law. It solicited these new member-
ships by written invitations mailed to persons recommended by its Virginia
members.' 0 The state Corporation Commission, relying on registered mail
service to sustain personal jurisdiction over the absent corporation, issued a
cease and desist order enjoining the sale of the securities.1
Appealing from the cease and desist order, the defendant corporation con-
to enjoin the sale of unregulated securities might be categorized as actions in refi. Ti
proceeding would then be against the entering securities as property brought within the
jurisdiction of the court and not against the defendant personally. Wilentz v. Edwards,
134 N.J. Eq. 522, 36 A.2d 423 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944) seinble. But such a shift in cate-
gories is made unnecessary by the liberal interpretation of in personaln jurisdiction in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See note 14 inIfra.
6. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
7. See Burdick, supra note 5, passin. That the attack is frequently made does not
signal its success. In fact, there has been a widening area in which states have been
permitted to obtain in personam jurisdiction over absent nonresidents. Thus, a nonresident
motorist by using the state's highways may be bound by statute to defend in that 'state
a suit growing out of an accident there. In such cases, due process is satisfied if the
statute affords reasonable probability of notice and allows reasonable opportunity to
defend. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAc'xca 11 4.16
(1948) ; Culp, Recent Developments in Actions Against Nonresident Motorists, 37 Micu.
L. REv. 58 (1938); Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists, 39 HARv. L. Ruv.
563 (1926). Similarly, an absent nonresident individual who sells securities through a
branch office may be subjected to that state's personal jurisdiction if the cause of action
arises out of such sales. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
See 2 MooaR, FEDERAL. PRacrica 114.17 (1948); Daum, The Transaction of Business
Within a State by a Non-Resident as a Fondation for Jurisdiction, 19 IowA L. REv. 421
(1934). Where the nonresident is a corporation, a given quantity and quality of business
activity within a state may render the corporation amenable to that state's in$ personatn
jurisdiction. For a general discussion of the activities that constitute "doing business" in
a state for purpose of subjection to suit there, where a corporation has not expressly
appointed an agent to receive service of process, see 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACMMcn %14.25
(1948) ; Note, The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. oF Cut L. REv. 523
(1949).
8. 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949), probable jurisdiction noted, 17 U.S.L.WEsx
3365 (U.S. June 14, 1949).
9. This type of security is exempt from federal regulation. See 48 STAT. 881 (1933),
15 U.S.C. § 77c(8) (1946).
10. Transcript of Record, p. 2, Travelers Health Ass'n y. Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949).
11. Id. at 27. Service was obtained under VA. CODE ANN. § 3848(52) (1942):
Where service cannot be had on persons or corporations because the securities are offered
by "periodicals, mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, or other means of communication front
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tested the constitutionality of the Blue Sky statute's jurisdictional provision.'
It recognized that International Shoe Co. v. Washington,'3 the latest Supreme
Court test for in personntm jurisdiction over nonresidents, required only such
"minimum contacts" as would prevent the suit from offending "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 4 But the corporation, relying
on the earlier case of Minnesota Commercial Mc's A4ssn v. Bcnu,'5 insisted
that Internatioml Shoe still demanded the presence of authorized agents within
beyond the limits of the State," jurisdiction in an injunctive proceeding may be ob-
tained "through the medium of at least 10 days' notice... by registered mail, return re-
ceipt demanded."
12. VA. CODE ANN. §3848(52) (1942), supra note I. The defendant maintained
that the section was unconstitutional in so far as it purported to "authorize the issue of
an in personam decree against .. . a foreign corporation not domiciled, domesticated
or doing business in this state, on substituted service of process." Brief for Appellants,
p. 33, Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.F_2d 263
(1949). See note 7 supra.
It also argued that Virginia's attempt to regulate the securities sold by mail was
an unconstitutional regulation of the United States mail. Brief for Appellants, supra, at
46. But this argument is wholly without merit. Congress has given the states permission
to exercise concurrent jurisdiction in regulating the interstate sale of securities. See 48
STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1946). See Merrick v. N.W.Halsey & Co., 242 U.S.
568 (1917), infra note 18.
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See note 14 infra.
14. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The case
involved a suit by Washington to recover unemployment compensation contributions
allegedly due from a foreign corporation. The corporation's contact with the state was
through several salesmen who resided there. Their authority was limited to exhibiting
samples and soliciting orders at prices and on terms fixed by the corporation; no sales-
man had authority to enter into contracts or to make collections. In pcrsonam jurisdic-
tion over the corporation was secured by personal service upon one of these salesmen,
coupled with registered-mail notice to the corporation at its principal place of business
in St. Louis, Missouri. In affirming a judgment in favor of the state, the Supreme Court
elaborated on its "fair play" rule:
"To say that the corporation is so far 'present' there [in Washington] as to satisfy
due process requirements ... is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms
'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's
agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of
due process .... Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with
the state of the forum as make it reasonable in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there. An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from
a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of business is relevant in this connec-
tion. . . ." Id. at 316-17.
"The activities carried on in behalf of appellant in the state of Washington ... were
systematic and continuous. . . . The obligation which is here sued upon arose out of those
very activities .... [T]hese operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state
of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair
play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant
has incurred there." Id. at 320.
15. 261 U.S. 140 (1923). See note 17 infra.
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the state.10 In the Benn case, the Supreme Court held that mail order sales
by a nonresident health insurance corporation to customers residing in Mon-
tana did not subject that corporation to Montana's in personam jurisdiction.
Solicitation of customers was by members residing in Montana who were not
agents of the corporation.1' These factual similarities to the Travelers' prac-
tices enabled it to argue that the Beim case controlled here.
But the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Benn case was not con-
trolling. While it might have done so by recognizing that International Shoe
in effect overruled Benn,'8 the court chose instead to distinguish the case on
its facts. In Ben, an individual was suing a foreign corporation on an in-
surance contract to obtain a money judgment; here, the state was conducting
an inquiry, "quasi-criminal in its approach," to determine whether the activi-
ties of a foreign corporation should be enjoined as violations of its Blue Sky
law.19 And, since Section 6 of Nebraska's Extradition Act20 enables Virginia
16. Brief for Appellants, p. 23, Travelers Health Ass'n v, Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949). International Shoe did not explicitly overrule
the Bemn case. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 319 (1945).
Moreover, International Shoe itself involved corporate agents physically present within
the state. The defendant cited the case at 326 U. S. 310, 316-17 (1945), where the Su-
preme Court, discussing the fiction of corporate presence, said: "For the terms 'present"
or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporafio's agent
within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due
process. . . ." (emphasis supplied by defendant). See note 14 supra.
17. "[I]t cannot be said that the Association was doing business in Montana merely
because . . . members, without authority to obligate it, solicited new members. That is
not enough 'to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the local
jurisdiction, and is by its duly authorized officers or agents present within the state or
district where service is attempted.'" Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn,
261 U.S. 140, 145 (1923).
18. The Supreme Court in Bein relied on the "mere solicitation rule" to determine
that the corporation was not "doing business" in the state for purposes of the suit in ques-
tion. But the "rule"-that solicitation alone, without other activities on the part of the
agents within the state is not "doing business," Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry.,
205 U.S. 530 (1907)-has been emasculated by the "fair play" approach of Ittrna.
tional Shoe, at least where the cause of action arises out of the solicitation. Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) ; cf. Storey v. United Insurance
Co., 64 F.Supp. 896 (E.D.S.C. 1946) (upholding statutory substituted service on a for-
eign corporation soliciting insurance by mail where cause of action arose out of such ac-
tivity). But cf. Cindrich v. Indiana Travelers Assur. Co., 356 Mo. 1064, 204 S.W.2d
765 (1947) (in a similar case, a similar statute held not to apply to insurer's transactions
in light of the Benn case, the court never mentioning International Shoe).
19. "The proceeding before us . . . is essentially different in its nature. It was in-
stituted, not by a contract holder, but by the Commonwealth. The appellants were being
investigated by the Commission to determine whether their activities did in fact violate
the Securities Act and constitute the commission in Virginia of a misdeameanor. The
inquiry is quasi-criminal in its approach." Travelers Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 188 Va. 877, 889, 51S.E.2d 263, 267 (1949).
The court relied for this distinction on Merrick v. N.W.Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568
(1917). But the Merrick case certainly does not authorize in personam jurisdiction over
an absent nonresident criminally accused. There the nonresident party engaging in the
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to extradite for past violations originating in Nebraska, Virginia should not
be precluded from bringing civil suit in its own courts to enjoin the defend-
ant's future violations. The court concluded, therefore, that the "fair play"
requirement of International Shoe vwas met by actual notice to the defendant 2 1
While the court's quasi-criminal approach serves to prevent the Blue Sky
violation in this case, its application in similar cases might prove unreliable.
Where nonresidents sell securities through the mail, the court's reasoning
rules out prohibition of Blue Sky evasion if the enforcing state provides no
criminal sanction for such violations.22 Nor can evasion be enjoined if the
seller's state has not adopted Section 6 of the Uniform Extradition Act or its
equivalent.2 Hence, the court's rationale makes the successful enforcement
of Blue Sky laws depend on the availability of extradition process, a factor
bearing no relationship to protecting the state's residents from unregulated
securities.
If the Blue Sky laws and similar protective statutes of the various states
are to be made effective against distant evasion, the strict territorial notion
of in personam jurisdiction should be frankly and completely abandoned.24
Since economic activities transcend state borders, a far more appropriate defi-
nition of jurisdiction is the equitable notion of "fair play" announced in Inter-
mail-order sale of securities, a partnership, was only one of many parties seeking an in-
junction against enforcement of the Michigan Blue Sky law. The others included foreign
corporations with agents in Michigan who solicited orders or sold capital stock directly.
Nowhere in the opinion itself, after the initial statement of facts, did the Supreme Court
advert to the situation as to the nonresident partnership or say specifically that the statute
did or did not apply to it. Nevertheless, the Michigan officials were left free to enforce
the state Blue Sky law against all parties, including the partnership. "The only safe
interpretation to put upon this phase of the opinion is that the state may prohibit and
make criminal a particular act, i.e. an offering or sale, effected 'within the state,'
whether or not it is initiated outside of the state." & NVAsH-Bu=;, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 262a.
Hence, it is not safe to say, as did the court in Travelers Health, that the Mcrrich
case established any distinction for purposes of in persona,, jurisdiction between ordinary
acts and acts violating state laws.
20. NEm. REv. STAT. § 29-706 (1943), which authorizes the Governor of Nebraska to
grant extradition when crimes are committed in another state, even though the accused
is not a fugitive from that other state. This is Section 6 of the Uniform Extradition
Act INTERsTATE Co TsnsSioN oN Cpam, HANDBOOK ON INTEsrA Cnam CoNmoL.
11 (1949).
21. "Nor do we think the proceedings ... offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice'... . The Commission might have undertaken to proceed against
the appellants by information or indictment and extradition. The present proceeding is
a very much less onerous one." Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 183 Va. 877, 896,
51 S.E. 2d 263, 271 (1949).
22. Every state makes it a crime to violate its Blue Sky laws except Delaware. See
DEL REv. CODE § 4369 (1935).
23. See note 20 supra. The substance of Section 6 has been adopted in thirty-two
states and Hawaii. See 9 UNrF. L. ANN. 169 (1942); id. at 30 (Cum. Annual Pocket
Pt. 1948).
24. See note 7 supra.
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utional Shoe, which merely asks whether it is reasonable, in the light of what
the nonresident is doing in the forum state, to maintain an action against him
there.
25
The "fair play" test involves a balancing of conflicting interests when ap-
plied to contract, tort and similar actions against nonresidents by individuals
or by states acting in an individual capacity.20 In those situations, therefore,
it is vague and unpredictable.27 But where the state as a sovereign seeks to
protect its citizenry, as in the Travelers Health case, its paramount right to
enforce its laws in its own courts outweighs any burdens imposed on the non-
resident. Here the "fair play" test reduces to the simple and fairly predictable
formula of "notice" to the absent offender. Reasonable probability of actual
notice, which a registered letter usually provides, meets the requirement of
25. "Whether due process is satisfied must depend ... upon the quality and nature of
the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was
the purpose of the due process clause to insure." International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
So, for example, the defendant's activities in International Shoe were "systematic
and continuous" and gave rise to the liabilities sued on. Such activities, establishing the
defendant's relationship with the state of the forum, made it "reasonable and just, ac-
cording to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the
state to enforce the obligation ... incurred there." Id. at 320.
Actually, the holding in International Shoe was not a radical departure from prior
cases-it merely discarded the fictions of corporate "presence" formerly resorted to by
the courts. See Note, The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. oF Cm. L.
REv. 523, 524 (1949). The extent and quality of the activities of a foreign corporation
within the forum state were always significant in determining whether the corporation
was doing such business in the state as to warrant the inference that it was "present"
for the purpose of defending the suit in question. Where courts held, as in Minnesota
Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Bean, 261 U.S. 140 (1923), supra note 17, that a corporation
was not "doing business" in the state,.the statement meant that the corporation's activities
were not so extensive as to make it reasonable to require it to defend there. See 2
Mooaz, FzDERAL PRAcricE 1 4.25 (1948).
While International Shoe involved a nonresident corporation, everything said there
is applicable to individuals as well. See Note, 16 U. oF Cui. L. REv. 523, 534 (1949).
See generally, Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32
HARv. L. Rnv. 871, 888-9 (1919) ; Daum, supra note 7, at 431.
26. According to Judge Learned Hand, whose reasoning in a prior case was relied on
considerably in International Shoe, the latter case held that in order to determine juris-
diction "the court must balance the conflicting interests involved: i.e., whether the gain to
the plaintiff in retaining the action where it was, outweighed the burden imposed upon
the defendant; or vice versa." Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F.2d 788, 790, 791
(2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948).
27. See McBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: Actions Arising Out of
Acts Done Within the Forum, 34 CALiF. L. R-v. 331, 336 (1946), where the test of
International Shoe is criticized as being no less vague and uncertain than the "presence"
theory which it abandoned. See note 14 supra. For cases applying the "presence!' theory,
see Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat. Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); People's To-
bacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); International Harvester Co, v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
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